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Let Privateers Marque Terrorism:
A Proposal for a Reawakening
ROBERT P. DEWrrE*
INTRODUCTION
In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, the United States has
repeatedly emphasized the asymmetry between traditional war and the War on
TerrorlI-an unorthodox conflict centered on a term which has been continuously
reworked and reinvented into its current conception as the "new terrorism." In this
rendition of terrorism, fantasy-based ideological agendas are severed from state
sponsorship and supplemented with violence calculated to maximize casualties.' The
administration of President George W. Bush reinforced and legitimized this
characterization with sweeping demonstrations of policy revolution, comprehensive
analysis of intelligence community failures,3 and the enactment of broad legislation
tailored both to rectify intelligence failures and provide the national security and law
enforcement apparatus with the tools necessary to effectively prosecute the "new" war.4
The United States also radically altered its traditional reactive stance on armed conflict
by taking preemptive action against Iraq-an enemy it considered a gathering threat
due to both state support of terrorism and malignant belligerency.
5
While the United States has taken drastic measures to manage the new security
threat through controversial legislative initiatives and foreign policy reformations,
* The author would like to express his sincere gratitude to Professor David P. Fidler for
his direction and aid in sifting the relevant from the irrelevant, as well as to his mother and
father, Donna J. and David B. DeWitte, who always knew he would thank them later.
1. The term "War on Terrorism" has been villified as something of a misnomer. Some
scholars have argued that referring to the fight against terrorism as a "war" implies that the rules
of war apply. See, e.g., Hans Corell, International Criminal Law-How Long Will Some Miss
the Missing Link?, 37 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 11, 18 (2005). In presiding over the opening
stages of the War on Terror, however, the Bush administration has refused to apply the laws of
war to terrorists by, for example, creating "enemy combatant" status, which under current law
makes it possible to withhold prisoner-of-war protections from individuals designated enemy
combatants. See Neil A. Lewis, Appeals Court is Urged to Let Guantanamo Trials Resume,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2005, at A21; Ken Silverstein, US. Military Lawyers Felt 'Shut Out' of
Prison Policy, L.A. TIMES, May 14, 2004, at Al0.
2. See generally LEE HARRIS, CwILIZATION AND ITS ENEMIES: THE NEXT STAGE OF HISTORY
(2004); WALTER LAQUEUR, No END TO WAR: TERRORISM IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2003);
Lee Harris, Al Qaeda's Fantasy Ideology: War Without Clausewitz, POL'Y REv., Aug.-Sept.
2002, at 19.
3. See NAT'L COMM'N ON TERRORIST ATrACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11 COMMISSION
REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATACKS UPON THE
UNITED STATES (Official Gov't ed. 2004).
4. See, e.g., Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required
to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115
Stat. 272 (codified in scattered sections of the U.S.C.).
5. See Howard Witt, U.S. Reveals Evidence to UN., CHI. TRIB., Feb. 6, 2003, at NI
(recounting Secretary of State Colin Powell's presentation in support of war on Iraq to the
United Nations).
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some weapons remain untapped. Dormant for over a century, the power to issue letters
of marque and reprisal-one of the oldest constitutional powers-could harvest one of
America's greatest strengths, the entrepreneurial spirit of private enterprise.
Letters of marque and reprisal have endured exhaustive analysis. Scholars have
approached the power from its role in the maintenance of separation of powers6 to its
status regarding the distinction between perfect and imperfect war.7 However, the
viability of their return to active duty for use as a legitimate war power has not been
squarely addressed. One possible reason is that letters of marque, typically issued to
privateers, were complicit in "privateering"--a practice wherein private enterprise
engaged in war for commercial gain. Privateering as a vocation, despite its contribution
to military victories, was outlawed as against the law of nations by the Declaration of
Paris in 1856.8 The United States, however, is not a signatory to this treaty, and
Congress could revive letters of marque and reprisal at any time.9
The purpose of this Note is to propose a resurrection of privateering under letters of
marque, despite its devolution into a relic of a past era. The goal is not political-this
proposal is equally viable regardless of the winds of partisan control. This Note
examines the possibility of reviving privateering for use in armed conflict with nonstate
belligerents, offers a rationale for doing so, and concludes with a brief analysis of the
feasibility of privateering in light of a plethora of legal and policy concerns. Part I
provides a summary of the traditional application of letters of marque and highlights
several key characteristics of letters of marque, including their inherent reliance on
private conduct. Distinctions between the historical era in which letters of marque
operated and today's world also receive emphasis, for they must be reconciled prior to
reviving privateering. Part II presents the conceptual and historical parallels between
terrorism and piracy. Part III applies privateering to terrorism through human capture,
asset seizure, and communication disruption. Part IV notes recent proposals to revive
letters of marque. Part V recognizes the need for supervision in privateering and
advances congressional regulation and judicial review as sufficient methods for
securing adequate oversight and accountability. Part VI presents the chief barriers to
the return of letters of marque and furnishes possible solutions.
I. TRADITIONAL UNDERSTANDING OF LETTERS OF MARQUE
In the nascent United States, when naval power was scarce, letters of marque and
reprisal licensed private citizens to make war against the people or seagoing vessels of
another nation.10 Reprisals sanctioned minor armed action presumably conducted in
retaliation for wrongs committed by another nation or its actors, agents, or proxies."
6. See, e.g., Jules Lobel, Covert War and Congressional Authority: Hidden War and
Forgotten Power, 134 U. PA. L. REv. 1035 (1986).
7. See, e.g., Charles A. Lofgren, War-Making Under the Constitution: The Original
Understanding, 81 YALE L.J. 672 (1972).
8. See THEODORE D. WOOLSEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
212-13 (5th ed. 1878).
9. See id. at 213; WILLIAm E. HALL, A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 526 (5th ed.
1904).
10. See WOOLSEY, supra note 8, at 209.
11. See Lofgren, supra note 7, at 692-93.
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This mechanism was also occasionally deployed in times of peace to obtain redress for
injuries.12 Letters of marque served as valid international legal tools utilized by nations
lacking sufficient naval forces to protect vulnerable interests braving the constant
treachery inherent to the high seas.' 3 These authorizations were issued to
"privateers" 4--private citizens who outfitted private ships, gathered crews, and
harassed enemy shipping under the guise of the government's often exceedingly broad
commission.1 5 Frequently staffed by "bold, lawless men," such ships lacked
supervision while at sea and therefore operated with considerable autonomy.16
Government commissions encompassed objectives spanning broadly from protection
of friendly merchant shipping, disruption of enemy shipping1 7 to battling enemy
piracy. 8 Common throughout the colonial age, privateering declined precipitously in
the mid-to-late nineteenth-century.
1 9
The Constitution bestows the power to issue letters of marque on Congress,20
thereby authorizing it to commission privateers under its discretion. Though
12. See WOOLSEY, supra note 8, at 186-88.
13. Seeid. at210.
14. The term "privateers" has been reinterpreted by recent scholarship and at times applied
to a different phenomenon: private contractors employed by the United States to manage or
accomplish war objectives. See Matthew J. Gaul, Regulating the New Privateers. Private
Military Service Contracting and the Modern Marque and Reprisal Clause, 31 LoY. L.A. L.
REV. 1489, 1501 (1998) ("Modem private military service contracting exhibits [the] same
characteristics and is the functional equivalent of eighteenth-century privateering."); Jon D.
Michaels, BeyondAccountability: The Constitutional, Democratic, and Strategic Problems with
Privatizing War, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 1001, 1009 (2004) (referring to military privatization and its
errors as those of "privateers").
"Privateer" and "letter of marque" historically referred to non-naval ships but meant different
things, based on a vessel's specific purpose as well as its size and maneuverability. Larry J.
Sechrest, Privateering and National Defense: Naval Warfare for Private Profit 7-9 (Indep.
Inst., Working Paper No. 41, 2001), available at http://www.independent.org/pdf/working_
papers/4 I_privateering.pdf [hereinafter Sechrest, Privateering]. However, both ships conducted
business under the authority of a "letter of marque and reprisal." Id. at 7-8. This Note uses
"letter of marque" as shorthand for "letter of marque and reprisal" to refer only to the actual
commission, not to the ship.
15. See C. Kevin Marshall, Putting Privateers in Their Place: The Applicability of the
Marque and Reprisal Clause to Undeclared Wars, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 953, 975 (1997) ("A
slightly less confining example is a successful petition for a commission 'to cruise against the
Enemies of these united States."' (citing GARDNER WELD ALLEN, MASSACHUSETTS PRIVATEERS
OF THE REVOLUTION 44-45 (1927)).
16. WOOLSEY, supra note 8, at 210 ("[Privateer crews] are made up of bold, lawless men,
and [work] where no superior authority can watch or direct them.").
17. Privateers were permitted to keep a large percentage of any booty captured from an
enemy ship, which alleviated the necessity of payment and provided the nascent government a
cheap source of military power. See id.
18. See infra Part II.
19. The United States has not issued letters of marque since the War of 1812. Marshall,
supra note 15, at 954 (citing Lobel, supra note 6, at 1045). They have been banned by
international treaty since 1856. Id.
20. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
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commentators have quibbled over the underlying purpose of the power,2 its
incorporation into the Constitution ensures that the power to enlist private assistance in
military conflicts-which could allow the President to act militarily entirely without
congressional participation or control-resides squarely with Congress.
22
Congress has not issued letters of marque since the nineteenth century for several
reasons. Privateers were rarely well-regulated, and though they could be held and
punished-sometimes even as pirates themselves-for exceeding the parameters of
their commission,23 this was far from an effective deterrent against lawlessness and
abuses both small and large were not uncommon. 24 Chaos characterized early activity
on the high seas, 25 yet privateers remained only marginally liable for any misdeeds. As
a prerequisite to obtaining a commission, privateers were required to post a bond
subject to surrender upon violation of the laws of the sea or the human rights of those
taken prisoner.26 Despite concerns over privateers' broad autonomy and the absence of
adequate safeguards to curtail abuses, commissioning a private naval force was an
absolute right under international law.
27
The early United States was the world's biggest proponent of privateering. Thomas
Jefferson extolled its virtues, stating, "[E]very possible encouragement should be given
to privateering in time of war .... Our national ships are too few.., to... retaliate
the acts of the enemy. But by licensing private armed vessels, the whole naval force of
the nation is truly brought to bear on the foe ... ,,28 Great confidence was placed in the
21. Compare Lofgren, supra note 7, with Marshall, supra note 15. See also supra notes 6-7
and accompanying text.
22. One of Congress's most potent war powers is the power of the purse, U.S. CONST. art I,
§ 8, cl. 1, which enables it to scale back military engagement by withholding necessary funding.
Were letters of marque not exclusive to Congress, the President could enlist the services of
private military firms without any Congressional oversight-for the government did not fund
privateers-and Congress, therefore, could not check the President's power by withholding
funding. See Marshall, supra note 15, at 979.
23. See WOOLSEY, supra note 8, at 216 ("These regulations ... subject the owners and
officers of privateers to heavy penalties in case of transgression."); Marshall, supra note 15, at
962.
24. See Marshall, supra note 15, at 971-72.
25. Despite the passage of time, little has changed. The oceans still represent the most
lawless and often perilous territory on the planet. For an exposition on the lawlessness of
today's oceans, see WILLIAM LANGEWIESCHE, THE OuTLAw SEA: A WORLD OF FREEDOM, CHAOS
AND CRIME (2005).
26. See WOOLSEY, supra note 8, at 216; Marshall, supra note 15, at 961.
27. See WOOLSEY, supra note 8, at 210.
28. GOMER WILLIAMS, HISTORY OF THE LIVERPOOL PRIVATEERS AND LETTERS OF MARQUE
459 (1966). Perhaps ironically, given its current status as the world's only hyperpower, the
United States supported privateering primarily because it preferred it to maintaining a standing
military force. See HENRY SUMNER MAINE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 101-02 (1888).
The United States consider powerful navies and large standing armies as
permanent establishments to be detrimental to national prosperity and dangerous
to civil liberty. The expense of keeping them up is burdensome to the people; they
are in some degree a menace to peace among nations. A large force ever ready to
be devoted to the purposes of war is a temptation to rush into it. The policy of the
United States has ever been, and never more than now, adverse to such
establishments, and they can never be brought to acquiesce in any change in
[Vol. 82:131
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entrepreneurial spirit of private Americans, whose disruption of British shipping during
the American Revolution proved integral to American victory. 29 The British House of
Lords admitted that, as of February 1778, Britain had lost 559 ships to American
raiders3 -a significant sum in any era. Privateers were more than important to
American triumph-they were the key cog in winning independence from the British.3 1
Given its tremendous impact, one is left to puzzle over privateering's departure
from the modem arsenal of armed conflict. To answer this question, it is necessary to
reemphasize that letters of marque were primarily the tool of nascent states that lacked
large militaries.32 As the United States grew in power and stature, it realized the
necessity of control over its armed forces and recognized the desirability of
maintaining a standing navy, which at times lost excellent recruits to the privateers'
lure of immense profit.
33
A. Private Funding as Pivotal to Privateering
The key to understanding privateering and traditional letters of marque is their
independent financial nature. The government abstained from financially enabling
privateering in any meaningful manner. Aside from printing the physical letters of
marque, the government remained uninvolved, and privateering thrived. Even so, many
modem discussions of letters of marque and privateering overlook privateers' financial
independence.34 Some scholars refer to modem military defense contractors as
"privateers," 35 despite the fact that these entities do not in fact function similarly. By
and large, projects and operations of defense contractors are instead funded and
regulated by the United States government, mostly through principles of contractual
obligation.36
Proper understanding of letters of marque, then, requires that any proposal for their
resurrection be undertaken in light of the assumption that privateers would be entirely
self-sufficient financially, and only regulated-not funded-by the government. A
International Law which may render it necessary for them to maintain a powerful
navy or large standing army in time of peace.... [Tihe surrender of the right to
resort to privateers [for nations lacking naval power] would be attended with
consequences most adverse to their commercial prosperity without any
compensating advantages.
Id. (quoting United States Secretary of State William L. Marcy).
29. See Sechrest, Privateering, supra note 14, at 7-9.
30. Id. at 9; see also WILLIAMS, supra note 28, at 216.
31. See Sechrest, Privateering, supra note 14, at 7 ("Historian Faye M. Kert offers the
judgment that 'without the presence of the American privateers in the Revolutionary War and
the War of 1812, the United States would never have been able to hold off the British Navy.' It
will surprise those who are enamored of the state monopoly of defense, but during the period of
Western European history from 1600 to 1815 privateers 'probably contributed much more than
warships to the actual harm done the enemy."' (citations omitted)).
32. See WOOLSEY, supra note 8, at 210.
33. See Marshall, supra note 15, at 966.
34. Both Michaels, supra note 14, and Gaul, supra note 14, muddy the conceptual waters
by referring to various actors in military privatization as "privateers."
35. Gaul, supra note 14; see also Michaels, supra note 14.
36. See generally Michaels, supra note 14.
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proper analysis of the feasibility of letters of marque therefore requires an inquiry into
the private sector's inclination and capability to perform the task.
1. Private Sector Inclination
First, private funding eliminates the government as a direct sponsor ofprivateering.
Conceptually, insofar as privateers hunt rogue individuals to claim a bounty, bounty
offers would require private subsidization. Though confining, this limitation does not
place the return of letters of marque outside the realm of possibility. Funding is
available from other sources. Just after September 11, a group of private investors
pledged one billion dollars to any private citizen who apprehended Osama bin Laden-
dead or alive.37 This type of offer-requiring at base the employment of private
citizens to conduct a military operation-is far from unprecedented. During the 1979
Iranian Revolution, billionaire H. Ross Perot funded a private military team in an
operation to rescue two of his company's employees imprisoned in Iran.38 More
recently, prominent American actor Bruce Willis has offered million-dollar bounties
for the capture of former Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein,39 as well as terrorist leaders
Osama bin Laden, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, and Ayman al-Zawahiri.4 ° With the advent
of formalized privateering, it is certainly plausible to infer that other offers would
surface.
2. Private Sector Capability
Second, not only is the private sector willing to finance capture efforts, but, as
Major Christopher M. Supernor has argued, it is also well-equipped to conduct the
hunt.4' In rejecting a licensing system for oversight of international bounty hunters,
Supernor argues that private enterprise would likely achieve greater success without
governmental involvement. According to Major Supernor, governmental regulations
would (1) prohibit opportunistic captures 42 (thereby indirectly reducing the number of
people engaged in the hunt), and (2) allow a host state to thwart bounty hunting efforts.
Scenarios wherein a host state may deny entry or supply false information to a
37. Larry J. Sechrest, Let Privateers Troll for Bin Laden, INDEP. INST., Sept. 30, 2001,
http://www.independent.org/newsroom/article.asp?id=l 19 [hereinafter Sechrest, Bin Laden]; see
also Paul Bedard, A Bounty Hunt for Bin Laden Yields Heads, Ears, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,
July 29, 2002, at 8.
38. Tom Morganthau, Jeff B. Copeland & John Walcott, Perot's Mission Impossible,
NEWSWEEK, Mar. 5, 1979, at 47.
39. BBCNews.com, Actor Willis' $1m Saddam Bounty, http://news.bbc.co.uk/
2/hi/entertainment/3141942.stm (last visited Jan. 13, 2006).
40. Rita Cosby, Willis Passionate About Iraq War, MSNBC, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/
id/10005665/ (last visited Jan. 13, 2006) ("Willis publicly announced he would offer [a] $1
million reward to a civilian if they turned in Zawahiri, bin Laden, or al-Zarqawi."). al-Zarqawi
has since been dispatched by the U.S. military. John F. Bums, AfterLong Hunt, US. Bombs Kill
Al Qaeda Leader in Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 2006, at Al.
41. See Christopher M. Supemor, International Bounty Hunters for War Criminals:
Privatizing the Enforcement of Justice, 50 A.F. L. REv. 215, 225-27 (2001).
42. See id. at 244 ("[M] any individuals who decide to forcefully capture [a fugitive] may do
so only as the result of a one-time opportunity ... ").
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privateer 43 are not difficult to envision. The magnitude of such concerns decreases
appreciably when government is uninvolved.
In particular, private military defense firms such as Military Professional Resources,
Inc. (MPRI) and Vinnell are highly competent and capable to accept such a challenge.
Such firms are battle-tested and have stood in the midst of some of the most dangerous
armed conflicts in world history: MPRI was a prominent player in the Balkan conflict,
providing expertise and consulting services, while Vinnell was deeply embedded in
secret intelligence operations during the Vietnam War.44 Certainly these private outfits
would be ready and willing to prosecute efficient and effective independent military
action.
II. PIRACY AND TERRORISM: NONSTATE BELLIGERENCY IN Two ERAS
Despite its devolution, privateering remains a viable option for dealing with a
nonstate enemy.45 Of the diverse purposes privateering served, deployment of
privateers to combat piracy is analogically the most applicable. Before establishing key
parallels between piracy and terrorism, however, it is necessary to examine the early
application of letters of marque.
Perhaps the most important characteristic of letters of marque was that they
legitimized the actions of a privateer. In the absence of a valid letter of marque,
privateers could be fairly tried, convicted, and punished for piracy. The effect, then, of
a letter of marque was that it immunized its possessor from piracy prosecution by
attaching state authorization to the actions of privateers. 46 Letters of marque could be
so broad as to permit privateers to engage any enemy, which logically included
pirates.
47
Authorized privateers were no strangers to confronting pirates lacking valid letters
of marque. Particularly where a fledgling state lacked naval strength, piracy placed
43. See id. at 244-45.
44. See Gaul, supra note 14, at 1493-97.
45. See Wendy McElroy, Is the Constitution Antiquated?, THE FREEMAN: IDEAS ON
LIBERTY, Nov. 1999, available at http://www.fee.org/publications/the-
freeman/article.asp?aid=4997 (arguing that such congressional action is as appropriate today as
it always was, when taken in historical context).
Furthermore, adhering to a strict-constructionist approach with regard to letters of marque
and reprisal is untenable. Gaul has argued that the application of the concept of letters of marque
and reprisal is not limited solely to the high seas, nor is it antiquated past the point of utility. In
discussing a new form of privateer-private American military services contractors-he asserts
that any sort of privately financed military operation conducted under the authority of the United
States is the functional equivalent of a letter of marque. Gaul, supra note 14, at 1501.
46. See Talbot v. Janson, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 133, 165 (1795) (observing that a privateer
obtained a commission of dubious integrity because he believed it would "excuse him from the
guilt of piracy"); 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 251 (Univ. Chi. Press 1979) (noting
that letters of marque allow privateers to "attack and seise" property "without hazard of being
condemned as a robber or pirate"); Eugene Kontorovich, The Piracy Analogy: Modern
Universal Jurisdiction's Hollow Foundation, 45 HARV. INT'L L.J. 183,214 (2004); Michael D.
Ramsey, Textualism and War Powers, 69 U. CHI. L. REv. 1543, 1615 (2002) ("With sovereign
authorization, a person engaged in reprisals would not.., be treated like a pirate.").
47. See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
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critical colonial commerce in jeopardy and constituted a formidable menace. Nascent
nations so situated empowered their governments to commission privateers when
"'infested by pirates"' for the duration of the danger.48 The fact that legislative drafters
considered the danger of piracy worthy of inclusion in the Constitution speaks to the
prevalence of privateering in early battles with piracy.49 Commissions authorizing
privateers to confront pirates functioned just as normal letters of marque: they
authorized their carrier to confront and capture pirates as prize.5s
A. Piracy and Terrorism: Similarities
The traditional international pirate organization 51 contained persons organized with
malicious intent engaging in acts disruptive of civilized nations.5 2 Pirate outfits were
not considered a legitimate body politic.5 3 Moreover, piracy constituted a crime against
the law of nations.54
Likewise, modem terrorist organizations often incorporate persons operating with
malicious intent and engaging in violent acts designed to disrupt civilization.
55
Terrorist groups in this sense are not considered legitimate political bodies. 56 As with
piracy, terrorism can be considered a crime against the law of nations. Terrorism,
however, has proven difficult to define, a dilemma recently generating abundant
derision in international circles.5 7 Domestically, even the federal government cannot
48. ALFRED P. RUBIN, THE LAW OF PIRACY 122-23 (1988) (quoting ARTICLES OF
CONFEDERATION art. IV § 5).
49. For a discussion of the enactment of commissions to hunt pirates, see id. at 80. Rubin
presents one French commission granting a privateer the authority not only to hunt ships of a
specific nation but also to engage pirates. Id. at 116 n.42. Furthermore, during the American
Civil War, the United States reserved the right to commission privateers only if necessary to
"suppress the piracy of European gunboats .... ." HENRY WHEATON, ELEMENTS OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 453 n. 173 (Richard Henry Dana, Jr. ed., 8th ed. 1866).
50. While commissions could authorize privateers to capture pirates, no law indicates that a
seaman was required to have a valid commission to lawfully fight pirates. RUBIN, supra note 48,
at 128.
51. Rubin differentiates between two usages of the term "piracy": that which refers to the
law of nations and that which refers to traitors of a sovereign hunted by that sovereign.
Commissions were granted for both purposes, but the consequences varied based on which
classification was used. That is, where a sovereign hunted its own treasonous subjects, no
international legal issues arose. See id. at 79-81.
52. See WOOLSEY, supra note 8, at 242.
53. Id. One common ground of confusion arises when considering the Barbary pirates.
While these roving bandits behaved much like pirates, they actually followed orders from North
African leaders, who had sufficient political organization and economic importance to make it
prudent to withhold the classification of "pirate" from those acting on behalf of the Barbary
states. See RUBIN, supra note 48, at 83.
54. See WOOLSEY, supra note 8, at 242.
55. See generally HARRIS, supra note 2.
56. Here there is arguably a comparison to the Barbary pirates, as some Middle Eastern
political entities may be considered terrorist groups masquerading as political parties, such as
the Palestinian Authority, Lebanon's Hezbollah, and Iran's Hamas.
57. See Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on International Terrorism, U.N. GAOR, 28th
Sess., Supp. No. 28 at 6-7, U.N. Doc. A/9028 (1973). Recently, the United Nations' 2005
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unite on one definition of terrorism.5 8 Regardless, the fact that courts have applied
international law to five general situations, one of which is "the punishment of piracy
and terrorism,' 59 speaks to a normative practice of equivalent treatment of piracy and
terrorism in international law.
Piracy and terrorism share basic conceptual similarities-in fact, many terrorist
organizations integrate piracy as a weapon in their arsenal. 60 First, both are forms of
nonstate belligerency. Second, their classification as nonstate actors is buttressed by
the nature of their hostility: complicity in acts of malice perpetrated by individuals
acting without the official, recognized sanction of any particular nation. Third, the
problems each engenders frequently afflicts multiple nations. Fourth, the damage done
by each includes either physical or financial injury-if not both-to citizens of a
particular state
Furthermore, twenty-first-century terrorism has a more fundamental similarity to
historical piracy. Terrorists populate closely knit groups that share a unifying goal:
attacking Western civilization-in particular, the United States-and thereby
threatening basic American values of life, liberty, property, and the pursuit of
happiness. Pirates acted in kind, differing from terrorism only in their focus on
financial gain.6' Recently, prominent terrorist groups have instead sought to implement
an ideological and political agenda anathema to the United States.
B. Where Piracy and Terrorism Diverge
Though the affinity between piracy and terrorism is fundamentally intuitive, several
material distinctions complicate the comparison. Because piracy operated almost
exclusively on the high seas, where no sovereign exercises territorial jurisdiction, it
was predominantly a "legal conception relevant only when no territorial jurisdiction
applied. 62 Despite the doctrine of universal jurisdiction, which permitted the
prosecution of a pirate in violation of the law of nations before any tribunal,63 this
ethereal jurisdictional component presents an analogical dilemma-terrorist activity is
primarily terrestrial, which dictates that some sovereign state exercises unquestionable
territorial jurisdiction. 64
World Summit failed to agree on a clear definition of terrorism. See Kofi Annan, A Glass at
Least Half-Full, WALL ST. J., Sept. 19, 2005, at A16. For its part, the United States
criminalizes terrorism outside its borders. 18 U.S.C. § 2332b (2000).
58. For a discussion and comparison of numerous federal legal definitions of terrorism, see
Nicholas J. Perry, The Numerous Federal Legal Definitions of Terrorism: The Problem of Too
Many Grails, 30 J. LEGIS. 249 (2004).
59. THOMAS M. FRANCK & MICHAEL J. GLENNON, FOREIGN RELATIONS AND NATIONAL
SECURITY LAW Ill (2d ed. 1993).
60. See Gal Luft & Anne Korin, Terrorism Goes to Sea, FOREIGN AFF., Nov.-Dec. 2004, at
61 (providing an examination of the convergence of terrorism and piracy).
61. See id.
62. RUBIN, supra note 48, at 129.
63. Id. at 149 ("Where an act has been denounced as crime by the universal law of nations,
... where the offence is one that all mankind concur in punishing, we have an offence against
the law of nations, which any nation may vindicate through the instrumentality of its courts."
(quoting U.S. v. Damaud, Wallace 143, 160-63 (3d Cir. 1855))).
64. See infra Part VI.C for a discussion of this dichotomy.
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The nonstate character of piracy and terrorism also confounds the United States'
national security apparatus. The ability of nonstate belligerents to operate without the
encumbrance of occupying specific territory, coupled with the absence of a legitimate
government with which to confer, undermines America's ability to respond via
conventional warfare. Traditionally, a cognizable attack emanating from a sovereign
state equipped with a legitimate government provoked a predictable, rational response:
war upon the aggressor, and if necessary, its allies.65 This option is inherently
unavailable for dealing with nonstate actors. The absence of an established outlet for
military retaliation necessitates the development-or redevelopment-of different tools
to engage the enemy.
During the era of piracy, both military vessels and privateers exercised force on
behalf of the United States. The military demonstrated reluctance to rely on privateers
in military engagements because the interrelationship between privateers and military
vessels was sometimes characterized by discord, and many privateers made decidedly
lackluster warriors. 66 These deficiencies, however, were relatively minor. A
comprehensive war effort requires more than military might, and privateers, evidenced
by the credit given to them by American Revolution historians, 67 provided a useful
service.
III. APPLYING PRIVATEERING TO TERRORISM
Privateers could play an equally indispensable role in the War on Terror. While
they cannot supplant the military in terms of operational expertise and firepower,
privateers could nevertheless provide a tremendous additional resource. Conceptually,
to maximize its effectiveness in the fight, privateering under letters of marque is
applicable to the new terrorism in three domains: human capture, asset seizure, and
communication disruption.
A. Human Capture
In considering the application of letters of marque to human capture, it is imperative
to evaluate the necessity of any proposed measure. The failure of current mechanisms
for capturing rogue individuals, coupled with the need to encourage successful terrorist
apprehension, obviates any need for further inquiry into the question. Currently,
extradition and international abduction are the dominant methods for apprehending
65. For instance, the United States responded to the bombing of Pearl Harbor prior to
American involvement in World War II with raids on the Japanese. While this is possible with
terrorism where the terrorist base is apparent, as it was in Afghanistan after 9/11, incriminating
evidence is not always manifest.
66. See Marshall, supra note 15, at 970. Marshall describes privateer ineptitude in battle
during the Penobscot Expedition in 1779, which was conducted against a British base on the
Penobscot River in Maine. Upon commencement of hostilities, privateers first urged their naval
compatriots to stall, and then "fled like stampeded cattle." Id. (quoting ALLEN, supra note 15, at
52). For a modem instance of alleged cooperation between private quasi-military individuals
engaged in human capture and the United States government, see Carlotta Gall, 3from U.S. in
Afghan Court, Accused of Running a Jail, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 2004, at A3.
67. See supra sources cited notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
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wanted persons.68 This Subpart establishes that the geopolitical, humanitarian, and
policy costs of maintaining the status quo outweigh its utility and accordingly further
fortifies the argument for the use of letters of marque.
1. Extradition
Extradition is a process whereby one state asks another to surrender an individual
within its territory or control.69 This cooperation is typically secured through treaty or
customary international law. 70 Treaties need not create binding obligations on
signatories,71 and states have discretion to refuse an extradition request. Indeed, the
United States itself does not view its own extradition treaties as creating an obligation
to extradite.72 This view is sometimes based on a state's right to guard its sovereignty
and the argument that a state's concurrent right to grant asylum overrides an extradition
treaty. 73 In the absence of an extradition treaty, principles of reciprocity and comity
under customary international law provide another avenue for securing an individual's
extradition.74 Reciprocity allows states to exchange fugitives, while comity refers to a
state demonstration of courtesy or goodwill in voluntarily extraditing a requested
individual.75
As a method for capture of wanted fugitives, extradition is imperfect. Because states
are often incapable or unwilling to apprehend wanted individuals, international
criminals may view nations recalcitrant in this regard as secure oases in which to hide
from punishment for misdeeds or atrocities. 76 The shortcomings of extradition as a tool
for bringing terrorists to justice are best illustrated by the prevalence and toleration of
the other dominant method of human apprehension: international abduction.77
2. State-Sponsored Kidnapping
International abduction is a popular but controversial solution for a state faced with
a rejected extradition request. Such abduction is in character related to rendition, a
process recently criticized in the international news media, by which terror suspects are
forcibly abducted and delivered for interrogation to nations which condone or practice
torture as a method of interrogation.78 "International abduction" is merely a euphemism
68. See Supemor, supra note 41, at 224-25.
69. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 623 (8th ed. 2004).
70. See Supernor, supra note 41, at 224.
71. Id. (citing Extradition Treaty Between the United States of America and the Mexican
States, U.S.-Mex., May 4, 1978, 31 U.S.T. 5059).
72. Id.
73. Id
74. Id
75. Id. at 225.
76. See id.
77. See id.
78. See, e.g., Craig Whitlock, Europeans Investigate CIA Role in Abductions, WASH. POST,
Mar. 13, 2005, at Al ("Italian authorities suspect the Egyptian was the target of a CIA-
sponsored operation known as rendition, in which terrorism suspects are forcibly taken for
interrogation to countries where torture is practiced.").
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for state-sponsored kidnapping, which violates international legal principles of state
sovereignty and territorial integrity.79 Abductions also violate the United Nations'
Charter, prohibiting use of force against another state unless conducted under the guise
of self-defense. 80 Despite such an ominous stigma against the practice, states routinely
engage in international abduction following failed diplomatic efforts.
81
It is of course manifest that American extradition requests may be met with
reticence by-for example-Middle Eastern nations known to harbor terrorists. Major
Supernor uses the specter of rampant illegal abduction as an argument favoring the
advent of a legal system for international bounty hunters to track war criminals and
bring them to justice. This logic is easily transferred to terrorist capture. The current
controversy over the definition of "terrorist" and "terrorism" (which could, given its
present ambiguity, potentially expose any American classified by another nation as a
"terrorist" to similar abduction) suggests that lawless abductions of foreign nationals
"arbitrarily" classified as terrorists would be dangerous both to American citizens
traveling abroad and to any war effort because it would jeopardize international
approval and further undermine American moral legitimacy. 3 Given that American
civilians are already commonly targeted by kidnappers in fractured Middle Eastern
nations, 84 a legal framework for conducting such operations is vastly preferable.
Regardless of these admittedly staunch admonitions, the degree of risk facing
Americans in anarchic nations is already so great that it would not significantly
increase with the revival of privateering. In addition, strict regulation would continue
to provide a modicum of international and domestic legitimacy and-perhaps more
importantly-credibility.
85
B. Terrorist Asset Seizure
Privateering need not be limited to human capture. Traditional privateers disrupted
the enemy by crippling its economic standing,86 an objective which is equally
applicable and vital to the War on Terror. Economic interruption of terrorist networks
could today be accomplished by privateers through seizure of terrorist assets.
To thrive, terrorism requires financial support, a fact which policymakers
recognized and moved to thwart with section 106 of the USA PATRIOT Act. Section
106 enables the President, upon declaration of a national emergency and subject to
proper jurisdiction, to seize property "of any foreign person, foreign organization, or
79. See Supemor, supra note 41, at 225-26.
80. Id. at 226.
81. See id. (describing Israeli, Egyptian, and American attempts at international abduction).
82. See id. at 216 n.8.
83. See supra note 78 and accompanying text (discussing alleged CIA abductions of
terrorism suspects in Italy).
84. See, e.g., Joe Hayden, Journalist Abducted in Iraq, SUNDAY TaRB. (Dublin), Jan. 8,
2006, at N17 ("On 8 December, the Islamic Army in Iraq claimed to have killed US [sic]
electrician Ronald Schulz. Other groups are holding a French engineer and four Christian
humanitarian workers--two Canadians, a Briton and an American."); Bob Herbert, Kindness's
Cruel Reward, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2003, at A25.
85. See infra Part V.
86. See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
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foreign country that he determines has planned, authorized, aided, or engaged in such
hostilities or attacks against the United States.,8 7 International legal bodies have also
leapt into the fray with the International Convention for the Suppression of the
Financing of Terrorism enacted ostensibly to deter and punish terrorist financiers by
prohibiting willful facilitation of financial support of terrorism.
88
Seizure of assets to disrupt enemy action is hardly novel, even as it extends to
modem terrorism. The United States govemment has specifically empowered itself to
do so for almost a century.89 However, absent governmental authority, private citizens
have not been expressly permitted to disrupt enemy action independently, and have
instead been deterred by threat of civil actions for damages or criminal penalties.
Letters of marque could be used specifically to enable private citizens to take action
against terrorists' financial infrastructures while immunizing those citizens from legal
consequence.
90
C. Communication Disruption
Technological aptitude is a hallmark of modem terrorist networks, 9' providing the
underpinnings necessary for operational and organizational expertise as well as an
uncomplicated mode of concealing financial resources and laundering money.92 Thus,
87. USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 § 106(I)(D), 50 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(1)(C) (Supp. III 2003).
This permits the President to take action domestically. Letters of marque would expand the
sphere of operations to permit privateers to act internationally under the color of American
commission.
88. International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, G.A. Res.
54/109, U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess., 76thplen. mtg., Annex at 3, U.N. Doc. A/RES/54/109 (Dec. 9,
1999).
89. This was accomplished under the Trading With the Enemy Act (TWEA) of 1917, 12
U.S.C. § 95a (2000), until 1977, when Congress enacted the International Emergency Economic
Powers Act (IEEPA), 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-07, to temper the possibility of presidential abuse and
to provide Congress with oversight. Charles A. Flint, Comment, Challenging the Legality of
Section 106 ofthe USA PATRIOTAct, 67 ALB. L. REv. 1183, 1201-02 (2003). Presidents have
successfully deployed the IEEPA against terrorism: President Carter first used it during the
Iranian Hostage Crisis, President Reagan used it against Libya, and President Clinton then used
it to combat groups attempting to disrupt the Middle East Peace Process. Id. at 1202-03. To
frustrate the efforts of terrorism supporters, President George W. Bush employed the IEEPA via
executive order on September 23, 2001. Id. at 1201 (citing Exec. Order No. 13,224, 3 C.F.R.
786 (2001)).
90. See infra Part VI for potential pitfalls.
91. See David Johnston & David E. Sanger, New Leaders are EmergingforAl Qaeda, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 10, 2004, at Al ("The new evidence suggests that [a]l Qaeda has retained some
elements of its previous centralized command and communications structure, using computer
experts like Mr. Khan to relay encrypted messages and directions from leaders to subordinates
in countries like Britain, Turkey and Nigeria."); Husain Haqqani, Subcontracting the Hunt for
Bin Laden, SALoN.cOM, Aug. 17, 2004, http://www.salon.com/news/feature/2004/08/17/
pakistanterrorism/indexnp.html (describing a captured al Qaeda operative as a "computer
wizard").
92. For a discussion of the ease with which money laundering can be accomplished via the
Internet, see Wendy J. Weimer, Comment, Cyberlaundering: An International Cache for
Microchip Money, 13 DEPAUL Bus. L.J. 199, 222 (2001).
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while human capture and asset seizure are both valuable and viable foci for
privateering, privateers could arguably have the greatest impact through disruption of
electronic terrorist networks and communications. Aside from utilizing cyberspace to
coordinate attacks, terrorists also engage in cyberterrorism, a mechanism by which
terrorists inflict damage and incite mayhem without direct violence. 93 Cyberterrorism is
low cost, relatively simple, operates without territorial boundaries, and could easily
wreak havoc on an unsuspecting nation.94 Engaging privateers to combat this strain of
techno-terror would substantially hinder the operational capacity of terrorism.
Moreover, the government finds disruption of terrorist cyber-activities somewhat
difficult. In perhaps the most famous recent hack of a terrorist Web site, a private
citizen gained control of al Qaeda's chief sounding board, www.alneda.com, but found
only frustration upon offering the opportunity to the FBI, which failed to locate anyone
with sufficient technical expertise to set up an effective sting operation, thus forfeiting
a golden counterterrorism opportunity.95 This example alone illustrates the vast
untapped potential of the private sector in fighting terrorism in cyberspace.
Disruption of terrorist cyberspace activity is the most cost-effective method of
privateering and would likely gamer the most interest, as well as the best results, given
terrorists' substantial dependence on accurate, detailed information. 96 In this way,
intrepid computer hackers, whose expertise can develop without formal training,
provide the most attractive form of privateering. Even in terms of safety, hacker
privateering represents the best option for privateers. Computer hacking generally
leaves one insulated from bodily harm (aside from nonlethal repetitive strain maladies
like carpal tunnel syndrome), thereby alleviating the deterrent effect of privateering's
inherent physical risks. Of course, none of these options will be available without
legislative action.
93. For a discussion of the havoc even simple cyberterrorism could wreak, see generally
Jason A. Cody, Derailing the Digitally Depraved: An International Law & Economics
Approach to Combating Cybercrime & Cyberterrorism, 11 MICH. ST.U.-DETROIT C.L. J. INT'L
L. 231 (2002). It should be noted that the broad conception of cyberterrorism does not confine
itself to the formulation used at present, which refers primarily to Islamic terrorism.
Cyberterrorism suffers from its own definitional crisis, similar to that of terrorism in general. See
supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text. For a discussion of cyberterrorism, see generally
Mohammad Iqbal, Defining Cyberterrorism, 22 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L.
397 (2004).
94. See Cody, supra note 93, at 240.
95. D. Ian Hopper, FBIBotchedAl-Qaeda Site Hacking Offer, N.Y. SUN, July 30, 2002, at
2; Associated Press, Man Hijacks Al Qaeda Site for FBI Use, USA TODAY, July 30, 2002,
available at http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/2002-07-30-al-qaeda-onlinex.htm.
96. Both human capture and asset seizure would likely involve considerable cost to
privateers, much as traditional privateering required heavy investment in outfitting ships. See
Sechrest, Privateering, supra note 14, at 9 ("Whatever the motivation in any specific case,
privateering required a significant investment. In Baltimore during the War of 1812, the total
cost of building a schooner of about 200 tons-the most common rig and size for privateers-
outfitting her, arming her, and providing a crew was at least $40,000 in 1813 prices." (citing
JEROME R. GARITEE, THE REPUBLC 's PRIVATE NAVY: THE AMERICAN PRIvATEERING BUSINESS AS
PRACTICED BY BALTIMORE DURING THE WAR OF 1812, 125 (1977))).
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IV. RECENT LEGISLATIVE ACTION
Policymakers have not entirely ignored the possibility of resuscitating letters of
marque and reprisal. The Air Piracy Reprisal and Capture Act of 2001,9 authored by
Congressman Ron Paul of Texas on the heels of September 11, proposed a
modification of the United States' statutory approach to piracy via the application of
traditional laws governing sea piracy to air piracy.98 This legislative initiative proposed
delegating to the President the power to issue letters of marque and reprisal to permit
privateering on land, at sea, or in the skies. Such delegation would give the President
the power to "subdue, seize, and take persons and property, using such force as may be
necessary to defend the lives, liberties, and property of the citizens of the United States
against piratical aggressions and degradations. . ... 99
Political commentators and researchers alike analogize early use of letters of
marque and reprisal in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century warfare to fighting terrorism
and assert that private enterprise can hunt terrorists and their assets more effectively
than the United States military machine.'t° The evolution of early privateering provides
a useful snapshot of the sort of progression possible if letters of marque were applied to
terrorism. Early privateering advanced from a niche weapon to a "potent means of
warfare, ' ° mobilizing self-interested privateers to swiftly hunt and capture as many
enemy ships as possible-an adaptable resource capable of inflicting serious damage
on the enemy.' 2 It requires no stretch of the imagination to envision a similar impact
on terrorism. Thus far, nothing of substance has come of Congressman Paul's proposal,
but with relatively minor modifications, the resurrection of letters of marque remains
viable.
V. CONGRESSIONAL REGULATION
In addition to the power to issue letters of marque and reprisal, the Constitution
empowers Congress to make rules concerning capture on land and water.' 3 Thus,
Congress can create a regulatory body and authorize it to draft a regulatory framework
tailored to the maintenance of a system of letters of marque for use in combating
terrorism. The promulgation of a carefully-crafted model for the regulation of
privateers is imperative for the viability of both the system and American credibility in
external national security matters. Many of the suggestions that follow resonate
predominantly in the context of human capture, as it raises the most conspicuous
potential violation of international law.
97. H.R. 3074, 107th Cong. (2001).
98. Id. § 5(b)(4)(B).
99. Id.
100. See Sechrest, Privateering supra note 14; Sechrest, Bin Laden, supra note 37.
101. See Sechrest, Bin Laden, supra note 37.
102. Privateering was once so effective that Lloyd's of London refused to offer maritime
insurance to British shipping except at exorbitant premiums. Sechrest, Privateering, supra note
14, at 26 (citing WILLIAMS, supra note 28, at 433).
103. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
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A. Pre-Privateering: Congressional Regulatory Scheme
In devising a regulatory scheme, Congress could look to licensing systems
applicable to bounty hunting and defense contracting as guidelines. Because bounty
hunting is regulated as an occupation by states, no uniform licensing system currently
exists. However, the system does permit extrapolation of some general guidelines.
Since many of the requirements of state systems serve the same purpose, attention will
be paid to only the criteria that best address the policy objective targeted by proposed
oversight. Military services contractors face a federal licensing system. Portions of this
system which are relevant to licensing privateers under letters of marque will also be
discussed.
1. Bounty-Hunting Licensing Systems as One Model
State bounty-hunting' ° 4 licensing bodies require that applicants be United States
citizens; hold a high school diploma; exceed twenty-one years of age; pass a drug test,
psychological examination, and written examination; and complete a training
program. 0 5 Convicted felons are excluded, as are individuals convicted of lesser drug
offenses and crimes of moral turpitude. 0 6 Many states mandate that bounty hunters
notify local law enforcement before engaging in surveillance, apprehension, or
capture. 107
Though requirements of educational aptitude, psychological competence, and a
modicum of moral rectitude are indispensable to the regulation of privateers,
citizenship may be irrelevant. Though foreign citizens operating under letters of
marque issued by another state were originally subject to charges of treason or
treatment as pirates by their country of origin,1 08 their exclusion today would detract
from an effort focused primarily on foreign states, where knowledge of terrain,
104. Most states use language referring to "bail enforcement officers" or "bail recovery
agents." See sources cited infra note 105. Insofar as these titles refer to individuals who conduct
similar operations-that is, hunting people-they apply to individuals classified under the
popular conception of bounty hunters.
105. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 697.173(1) (LexisNexis 2003). Other states have similar
requirements, with some variations. See also ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-84-114 (2005) (requiring
notification of local law enforcement before attempted apprehension); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 17-6-
56 to -57 (2004) (requiring a valid firearm license, a minimum age of twenty-five, and
notification of local authorities before engaging in surveillance, apprehension, or capture); IND.
CODE ANN. § 27-10-3-5 (West 2003) (including a state residency requirement and a lower age
limit (eighteen)); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 597:7-b (2001) (requiring notification of local law
enforcement before searching for a fugitive); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-11-318 (2003) (requiring
notification of local law enforcement prior to taking a person into custody); UTAH CODE ANN. §
53-11-109 (2004) (requiring 2000 hours of experience as a bail recovery agent or law
enforcement officer).
106. E.g., NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 697.173(1).
107. See sources cited supra note 105.
108. See WOOLSEY, supra note 8, at 216. But see HALL, supra note 9, at 599 ("The
acceptance of letters of marque by neutral subjects from a belligerent is now prohibited by
international common law, and is always forbidden by the neutral sovereign, although from
several points of view the act is unobjectionable.") (footnote omitted).
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language, and cultural norms is at a premium.'19 If the regulatory body attaches urgent
importance to citizenship, perhaps particularly valuable privateers could be funneled
through an expedited citizenship application process." 0 In addition, a background
check deeper than a cursory criminal record search would be advisable.
Notification of law enforcement agencies, however, promises to significantly
heighten the risk facing privateers. Since privateers would often operate in nations
hostile to Americans and American war efforts-some of which may actively harbor,
protect, and support terrorists-alerting allegiant law enforcement would interject an
insurmountable obstacle into human capture, eliminating the element of surprise and
enabling fugitives to escape."' Even more ominous, state authorities could conceivably
attempt to capture and/or kill privateers. Therefore, Congress should not require human
capture privateers to alert local law enforcement of their presence or objectives. Even
so, Congress should not prohibit contact of local law enforcement either, as some
nations may be receptive to aid requests and thus willing to assist a privateer in
apprehending an undesirable individual hiding out within its borders.
2. Defense Contractor Licensing as Another Model
Congress need not start from scratch in privateer regulation. Some scholars-such
as Matthew J. Gaul-have referred to private defense contractors as today's "new
privateers."' 1 2 The regulatory system governing such contractors may therefore provide
an instructive template from which to model a satisfactory system. The Arms Export
Control Act1" 3 requires private defense contractors to register with the State
Department and obtain a license for each project.'' 4
This can be applied to a regulatory system for modem privateering. However, where
the Arms Export Control Act closely regulates the export of military equipment and
expertise to foreign countries,' 15 and is thus relatively narrow, regulation of letters of
marque should be as broad as oversight will allow, especially in the realms of asset
seizure and communication disruption. Since assets and communications are at times
fluid, quickly shifting from one location to the next,' 16 Congress should permit its
regulatory body to provide a measure of flexibility appropriate for the pursuit of broad
objectives.
109. CIA Careers: Foreign Language at the CIA, https://www.cia.gov/careers/lanforeign.
html (last visited Aug. 21, 2006).
110. In the past, legislators have made appeals on behalf of outstanding foreign athletes
seeking to gain citizenship and thereby represent the United States in international athletic
competitions. Surely legislators would be equally amenable to granting citizenship to a
demonstrably capable privateer. See, e.g., Press Release: Sen. Schumer, Rep. Kelly Call on INS
to Grant Citizenship to U.S. Olympic Hopeful (Nov. 6, 1999), http://www.senate.gov/-schumer/
SchumerWebsite/pressroom/press releases/PR00069.html.
111. See Supernor, supra note 41, at 242.
112. E.g., Gaul, supra note 14, at 1500-01.
113. Arms Export Control Act (AECA), 22 U.S.C. § 2778 (2000).
114. Id. at § 2778(b).
115. See id.
116. See supra Part IV.B-C.
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Congress may also require that privateers contribute a percentage of their reward to
a fund in which all licensed, active privateers could share. This would provide a safety
net for unsuccessful privateers, as well as encourage coordination between disparate
privateering outfits.
B. Post-Privateering: Judicial Review
Judicial review would further enhance privateering oversight. In the era of piracy,
upon capture, the law required privateers to present their booty at a neutral port for
scrutiny by a duly-constituted prize court in order to determine the lawfulness of the
seizure.'1 7 If deemed lawful, the seized goods were sold at auction, and privateers
reaped a portion of the proceeds, some of which reverted to the government
responsible for issuing the concordant letter of marque.'i1
Prize courts typically reviewed the legality of a capture before granting privateers
title to it and were often the only substantive check on privateers. 119 While it is
intellectually entertaining to consider the circus that could ensue were captured
terrorists put up for auction-the consequence of a direct application of prize law to
human capture-the system is not so alien as to render it immune to adaptation. Upon
capture, pirates were set for trial in court, and property seized was distributed pursuant
to prize law.' 20 Where early prize courts reviewed a capture to determine whether
privateers could claim valid title, a modem prize court could review a privateer's
commission to ensure that the capture conformed to proper procedures (including, for
human capture, that the privateer provided adequate care to prisoners). If the privateer
violated the terms of the commission or other applicable law, the court could lawfully
refuse to grant any reward tendered. A modem prize court could likewise include
consequences for the violation of the rights of a neutral party, as original prize courts
did,12' and determine what portion of a reward each privateer could claim in the event
of a joint operation.
117. See MAINE, supra note 28, at 96; WHEATON, supra note 49, at 478-79.
118. See WOOLSEY, supra note 8, at 216 ("It is only the commission which gives an interest
in a prize, since all captures vest originally in the state.").
119. See Marshall, supra note 15, at 975.
120. See RuBiN,supra note 48, at 131-32.
121. The importance of this power might be especially key to preserving credibility in
enacting modem application of letters of marque. Specifically in terms of human capture, where
a private bounty calls for the capture of the subject-dead or alive-the stakes are especially
high. Reports from Afghanistan indicate that the currency of bounty hunters is human ears and
also that, in response to the government bounty's requirement of proof, the FBI has received
severed heads which, after DNA checks, were found not to belong to those among the hunted.
Bedard, supra note 37; see also Weekly Intelligence Notes, #29-02, Association of Former
Intelligence Officers, July 22, 2002, http://www.afio.com/sections/wins/2002/2002-29.html
("One hunter recently claimed he had beheaded bin Laden aide, one Ayman AI-Zawahiri, and
asked the Pentagon for the $25 million reward. The Pentagon apparently asked for proof and
they received the severed head-but the FBI found [it] wasn't Zawahiri's.").
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VI. POTENTIAL RISKS: HAZARDS TO CONSIDER IN THE
SECOND COMING OF LETTERS OF MARQUE
The return of letters of marque clearly requires some measure of legal and political
adaptation. Domestically, letters of marque, if properly enacted and delegated, are
constitutionally valid. Congress has the power to create and determine thejurisdiction
of domestic tribunals under the Constitution' 22 and is therefore free to reconstitute
prize courts to govern privateering. Unless an international obligation (such as an
executive agreement or treaty) has been properly consented to by Congress and ratified
by the President, it does not bind the United States. Here, the United States is not
bound by any specific international obligation against privateering, and domestic
courts would thus be compelled to apply only domestic law which would not expressly
militate against privateering. However, customary international law, which consists of
commonly observed practices in international relations (and thus includes prohibition
of privateering), provides a formidable barrier to international legitimacy.
Letters of marque stand on unsteady ground internationally due to the renunciation
of privateering by the Declaration of Paris of 1856.123 Thus, the United States must
take action in international legal sectors to fortify the validity of letters of marque. The
following Part analyzes legal and policy hazards associated with a return of letters of
marque. Five tensions in particular present the most formidable barriers to the return of
privateering: (1) problems with privatization of military functions, (2) state
responsibility doctrine in relation to liability for the acts of privateers, (3) the
analogical dilemma of violating sovereign jurisdiction, (4) potential discord in the
regulatory scheme, and (5) constitutional deadlock between the President and
Congress.
A. The Evils of Privatization of War
Given that letters of marque are domestically valid, the most substantial barrier to
the United States exhuming privateering from the dustbin of history is found in the
admittedly vast range of conceivable adverse international consequences. Privatization
of military functions has grown tremendously in the past century and generates
significant risks, a topic on which commentator Jon D. Michaels has written an
exhaustive critique.1 24 While his argument against military privatization is both
comprehensive and persuasive, it does not squarely address resuscitation of letters of
marque. This is in part because Michaels is concerned about an issue not directly
applicable to this proposal-the delegation of traditional governmental military
functions to private enterprise.125 Despite Michaels's concerns, private enterprise is the
engine that drives letters of marque.
Letters of marque, therefore, do not fit within Michaels's conception of "core
governmental responsibility over military engagement ... delegated to privateers"'' 26
and are not subject to the same constraints. They are instead a valid legal mechanism
122. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9.
123. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
124. See Michaels, supra note 14.
125. See id. at 1048.
126. Id.
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that does not overtly upset the constitutional balance of power. Of the three chief
concerns Michaels sees in the privatization of military functions, two are salient to the
scope of this Note: (1) the possibility that reinstating letters of marque may diminish
the effectiveness of the United States military, and (2) the possibility that reviving
letters of marque may "undermine the already weak diplomatic and moral standing of
the United States abroad.,
127
1. Privateering May Undermine the United States Military
The Uniform Code of Military Jus'ice (UCMJ) governs only members of the armed
forces and therefore would not control privateers.'28 This is simultaneously a strength
and a weakness of privateering in that it frees privateers to act outside general military
guidelines, but also creates the danger of abuse. The lack of an applicable and stem
justice system for violation of a commission presents the possibility that a system of
regulation may not be taken as seriously as is warranted. Without recognizable
penalties, the likelihood that the limits of a privateer's commission will be either
misunderstood or altogether abandoned-an ordinary occurrence in early
privateering 29-increases dramatically. Where military forces may hold fast in a battle
or initiate a firefight in pursuit of a terrorist, private enterprise may, absent an
affirmative obligation to remain, be more likely to retreat and protect its investment.
130
While this would certainly present a host of issues if private forces replaced the
American military-the premise of Michaels's discourse-privateers acting under
letters of marque would not be military replacements but instead supplemental
resources. Though one can envision a situation in which privateers, perhaps
unwittingly, interfere with or unintentionally sabotage a military operation, the sheer
number of targets for privateers to pursue, contrasted with the constraints inherent in
large-scale military efforts at human capture (e.g., lack of stealth, interference by
members of a foreign state), makes such an occurrence likely to be exceedingly rare.
Perhaps a more salient uncertainty emerges from early privateering, where talented
seamen eschewed military service in favor of enlisting in private outfits armed with the
promise of lucrative returns and a more relaxed lifestyle.' 31 This concern remains
127. Id. Michaels's third concern, the subversion of constitutional imperatives of limited and
democratic government, is beyond the scope of this Note, for no constitutional change is
necessary to revive letters of marque.
128. The Uniform Code of Military Justice covers all members of the military. See 10 U.S.C.
§ 802(a) (2000).
129. See, e.g., supra note 66.
130. See Michaels, supra note 14, at 1092-93 (describing occurrences where private contract
personnel abandoned battles and noting Pentagon studies that found commercial contractors
may have fled other theaters of battle, such as the Persian Gulf War, had hostilities intensified).
131. See Marshall, supra note 15, at 973-74 ("Payment by private parties rather than the
government was one of the allures of privateering, since it was more certain and more
lucrative."); Sechrest, Privateering, supra note 14, at 12 ("It should be no surprise that serving
on a privateer was often much more popular than naval service. 'Compared to the relatively free
and easy life of privateering, life aboard a naval vessel must have seemed grim and oppressive."'
(quoting Faye Margaret Kert, Prize and Prejudice: Privateering and Naval Prize in Atlantic
Canada in the War of 1812, REEARH IN MARITME HISTORY No. I ., 1997, at 121)).
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ubiquitous, as rumors of current and former military personnel trying their hand at
bounty hunting trickle out from the Middle East.' 32 Such rumors are made more urgent
in the letters-of-marque context by the possibility that discharged soldiers may join
privateer outfits. Many retired military personnel already obtain postmilitary
employment with defense contractors.' 33 It is thus certainly plausible that young
military personnel may be tempted to join up with privateers instead of the official
military. The latent risk is that privateers may fill their ranks with soldiers discharged
from the military for disciplinary reasons-soldiers who were perhaps less than
observant of military standards-and subsequently jeopardize the American
international image as a human-rights-conscious military. To alleviate this problem,
Michaels argues that it may be possible to extend the UCMJ to privateers.' 34 However,
it is not clear that this is desirable, and it may in fact deter prospective privateers from
engagement. 35 Another option, should strict discipline be desired, is for Congress to
model certain aspects of its privateer regulatory code on the UCMJ.
2. Privateering May Undermine the United States'
International Diplomatic Position
Michaels also details the potential damage that privatization of military functions
may inflict in international legal and diplomatic spheres. Again, though reviving letters
of marque and privateering would not represent a true "privatization" of military
functions, 136 the impact private individuals engaging in quasi-military action could
exert on the United States' image in the international community dictates that the
consequences Michaels suggests apply with the same resonance, and thereby threaten
to undermine American foreign policy and credibility abroad. A policy in favor of
privateering may also encourage reciprocal privateering measures by other nations,
which may not be as capable of policing such a system.'
37
a. Alienation of Allies
Engaging the services of privateers who cite profit as their overwhelming goal may
insinuate that the United States has cast off the self-imposed historical restraint of
stringent military disciplinary standards.138 While this may serve to notify a barbaric
132. See, e.g., Carlotta Gall, Ex-G.L, Charged in Kabul, Says He Was on US. Mission, N.Y.
TIMES, July 22, 2004, at A3. Jonathan K. Idema, a former member of the U.S. Special Forces,
was charged with running a private jail in Afghanistan. He claimed he operated with the blessing
of the United States military, and was eventually convicted and sentenced to eight to ten years in
prison. See Carlotta Gall, Mercenaries in Afghan Case Get 8 to 10 Years in Prison, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 16, 2004, at A12.
133. See Michaels, supra note 14, at 1022 (listing a number of prominent former military
officers employed by Military Professional Resources, Inc., an elite defense contractor).
134. Id. at 1123.
135. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
136. See supra notes 125-27 and accompanying text.
137. See Michaels, supra note 14, at 1111.
138. See id.
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enemy that the United States is itself prepared to descend into barbarism, 39 it would
also greatly discourage an international community already shaken by post-September
11 American unilateralism. Further alienation of traditionally Western nations140 only
widens the already gaping chasm of misunderstanding between these nations and the
United States and intensifies mistrust, which may compound American difficulty in
securing future allies. Furthermore, American allies may also infer that a mission
delegated by the United States to privateers, instead of its military, may be outside core
American interests.
1 41
This concern-though rational-is without foundation. The United States has
already engaged its armed forces exhaustively in human capture.142 Instead, the
willingness to permit private citizens to join the fray marks an escalation of both
hostilities and American commitment. Also, because of the importance of secrecy to
human capture, privateers are more likely to take appropriate precautions to remain
clandestine. Moreover, the United States may find that the trouble created by skittish,
reluctant allies outweighs any benefits and instead decide it is essentially on its own
against terrorism, which renders any concern over ally alienation virtually moot.
b. Setting a Perilous Global Precedent
Assuming privateers take seriously their obligation to adhere to the regulatory
scheme, the necessity of such adherence to claiming a reward suggests they will act
with a high level of professionalism. Obligations laid out as prerequisites to cashing in
captured prizes are likely to keep privateers in line, for violation of such tenets could
realistically result in tremendous financial loss.1
43
Comparatively, private American defense contractors operate with a far greater
modicum of integrity than foreign military firms. 144 This is perhaps due to the tendency
of foreign firms to accept employment from despotic or oppressive governmental
139. For an argument that this is the logical conclusion of descending even slightly into
barbarism, and that barbarism is necessary to defeat the current enemy, see HARRIs, supra note
2.
140. For an illuminating discussion of the gradual shift away from Western societies in
Europe propagated by demography, see Mark Steyn, It's the Demography, Stupid, THE NEW
CRITERION, Jan. 2006, at 10, available at http://www.opinionjournal.con/extra/?id=l 10007760.
Should the symptoms of a decline of Western nations begin to accelerate, as predicted in Steyn's
argument, the United States may find itself without allies no matter its policies, in which case
letters of marque may become vital.
141. Michaels, supra note 14, at 1111.
142. See Barton Gellman & Dafna Linzer, Afghanistan, Iraq: Two Wars Collide, WASH.
POST, Oct. 22,2004, at Al (describing the expensive and fruitless efforts of the military to hunt
bin Laden); James Risen & David Rohde, A Hostile Land Foils the Quest for Bin Laden, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 13, 2004, at Al (describing military pursuit of bin Laden as "sidetracked by the
distractions of the Iraq War").
143. Again, this is likely true in terms of human capture, whereas the financial consequences
for violation of regulatory obligations by privateers engaged in asset seizure and communication
disruption are murkier.
144. See Michaels, supra note 14, at 1118.
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regimes,145 which for a host of reasons do not always operate under social norms akin
to those of the United States.
Regardless, a grave predicament lurks. Should American approval of privateering
induce other nations to follow suit, egregious international abuses may result. Foreign
military defense firms have already tumbled down this slippery slope: several worked
at various times on both sides of the Zaire-Congo conflict in the late 1990s.146 A
similar failure to adhere to a moral code by foreign privateers would likely engender
expansive mercenary activity, a development that could be accompanied by obscene
brutality. Should foreign privateering evolve into, for instance, indiscriminate
kidnapping of Americans across the globe, the United States could find itself in even
greater peril, a fact which only underscores the importance of careful regulation and
United Nations Security Council (UNSC) participation to the maintenance of peace
and stability.
147
B. United States Liability for Privateering: The Law of State Responsibility
Another unseen tension arising from the return of letters of marque is whether the
United States could be held liable for the actions of privateers. The difficulty in
answering such a question emanates from the nature of privateering, as it demands
governmental authorization ofprivate action against foreign actors for economic gain.
Insofar as privateers act pursuant to their commission, the United States may face
liability for the actions of carriers of letters of marque. Though at first glance it may
appear that Congress could insulate itself from responsibility by shifting the burden of
liability to the owners of privateering outfits, such a view improperly equates state
responsibility with civil liability.
In times of piracy, states issuing letters of marque were held liable when a privateer
behaved in a wanton or unnecessary manner. Upon such a determination, both the
privateer and the issuing government could potentially be held responsible under
international law. 148 While many of these principles are pursuant to the Declaration of
Paris, a pact by which the United States is not bound, the problem is not so dexterously
disposed. 
149
Basic customary international law does not squarely address United States liability
for the actions of privateers under the doctrine of state responsibility. 50 Liability
145. Id.
146. Id.; see also Philip Winslow, Why Africa's Armies Open Arms to Elite Fighters From S.
Africa, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Oct. 19, 1995, at I ("[T]oday they're there to defend you,
tomorrow those forces will be there to overthrow you." (quoting South African Deputy Foreign
Minister Aziz Pahad )).
147. See infra Part VI.B.
148. See WOOLSEY, supra note 8, at 251. This referred particularly to neutral parties, which
at first glance makes it of little utility. However, in the absence of a declaration of war (or
perhaps an authorization for use of military force), nearly all nations, regardless of complicity or
involvement of their subjects in an attack, are technically neutral parties.
149. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
150. For the most current enunciation of state responsibility law, see the Int'l Law Comm'n,
Text of the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, in
Report of the International Law Commission, at 43, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001), available at
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hinges on whether a state's involvement in action related to the acts of its citizens
surpasses a certain threshold. State responsibility can be found for belligerent action
not obviously attributable to or claimed by a government when (1) clear and
convincing evidence of a state's involvement is discovered,' 5 1 (2) it sends agents to act
aggressively on its behalf, 152 and possibly when (3) the government exercises "effective
control" over the belligerent groups.' 53 In a recent state responsibility case, the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia stated:
The control required by international law may be deemed to exist when a State (or,
in the context of an armed conflict, the Party to the conflict) has a role in
organising, coordinating orplanning the military actions of the military group, in
addition to financing, training and equipping or providing operational support to
that group.' 54
Whether or not the law of state responsibility could hold the United States liable for
the acts of privateers depends largely on the structure of the system. State
responsibility cases usually involve some form of covert action. Privateering under
letters of marque may not necessarily be covert. The issuance of letters of marque
would likely be a public governmental avowal of privateering, which may remove it
from the realm of covert action. Also, regarding the three criteria above, the threshold
of "involvement," the definition of "sending" (as opposed to "permitting") an agent,
and the threshold for "effective control" leave the outcome of any adjudication against
the United States involving American privateering enshrouded in an impenetrable fog.
Outside of state responsibility, however, privateers acting under their own
discretion, absent governmental instructions and funding, would not violate pertinent
applicable international law against intervention. For example, Article 2(4) of the
United Nations Charter, which prohibits a state from using or threatening to use force
against another, would not apply to privateers. Since a carrier of a letter of marque
would remain a private party unsupported by government funding, privateers would not
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/reports/2001/2001report.htm.
151. See id. at 44-45.
152. See G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), art. 3, Annex, U.N. Doc. AIRES/3314 (Dec. 14, 1974)
("Any of the following acts, regardless of a declaration of war, shall . . . qualify as an act of
aggression: ... (g) The sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars or
mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against another State of such gravity as to
amount to the acts listed above, or its substantial involvement therein.").
153. See Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 114-15
(June 27). The United States has been embroiled in this sort of controversy before. The
International Court of Justice (ICJ) adjudicated a claim brought by Nicaragua against the United
States. Nicaragua accused the United States of attacking oil pipelines, mining ports, and
violating air space. Id. 15b. Nicaragua also alleged that the United States was complicit in
training, arming, financing, and supplying internal paramilitary activities in opposition to the
Nicaraguan government. Id. 15a. The United States for its part claimed that any action
attributable to it was permissible within the doctrine of collective self-defense, which the ICJ
ultimately rejected. The United States was not, however, held liable for the acts of the Contras,
who were rebels allegedly supported by the United States' government, as the ICJ determined
they did not exercise "effective control." Id. 114-15.
154. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-I-A, Judgement, 137 (July 15, 1999).
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fall within the scope of Article 2(4). 155 However, if privateers are considered "agents,"
under general agency principles, they would then become state actors and violate
Article 2(4).56
To guard against this danger, the United States may seek a UNSC Resolution
permitting the return of letters of marque for the pursuit of terrorists. Since the UNSC
has the power to authorize uses of force that otherwise violate Article 2(4), privateers,
even if considered state agents, would be immunized from culpability, and the United
States would be exempt from prosecution for state responsibility.
157
The UNSC's authority to permit such uses of force presumes that the authorized
force is necessary to maintain international peace. Here, allowing targeted action
against specific individuals may help maintain international peace by eliminating the
urge to abide by an outdated mentality and prosecute a war on an entire country only to
apprehend a small group of belligerents.
Finally, because President Bush has declared that any country which knowingly
harbors or supports a terrorist is responsible for the terrorist's acts, 158 any argument
that the United States is not responsible for the acts of its private citizens risks severe
diplomatic repercussions, if only out of other nations' intolerance for facial hypocrisy.
C. Jurisdictional Dilemma
The most problematic distinction between piracy and terrorism for purposes of
applying letters of marque is jurisdictional. Pirates operated on the high seas, where no
sovereign exercised exclusive jurisdiction, whereas terrorism in its most publicly-
understood form operates primarily on land, where jurisdiction is normally clear. The
establishment of the viability of letters of marque for use in fighting terrorism requires
a solution to this dilemma.
The best answer may require procurement of a UNSC Resolution authorizing use of
letters of marque to target certain groups or individuals. Deliberations over who or
what should be appropriately subject to the wrath of privateers need not be kept secret.
Higher publicity could lead to vital intelligence information and may increase success,
which could both enhance the efficacy of letters of marque and reinforce the public
stance of America on terrorism--that its war is chiefly with terrorists, not with their
associated communities or religions.
59
In addition, anonymity and legal protection for privateers should be secured.
Without these protections, aspiring privateers face the risk of severe criminal penalties
155. See Supemor, supra note 41, at 239.
156. See Military and Paramilitary Activities, 1986 I.C.J. 14, 114-15.
157. Id.; see also U.N. Charter arts. 41-42.
158. THE WHITE HOUSE, THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA 5 (Sept. 17, 2002), http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2002/nss.pdf.
159. See Threats and Responses; President Meets Muslim Leaders in Post-911 First, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 11, 2002, at A20 ("Three participants at the meeting, at the Afghan Embassy in
Washington, said the [P]resident told the group that he was concerned about growing anti-
American sentiment in Arab and other Muslim countries and that he wanted to repeat the
message that he sent last fall that the United States was at war with terrorists, not with Islam.").
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under foreign legal systems, 160 are deterred from attempting to capture fugitives, and
may find their efforts frustrated by uncooperative governments.1
6
'
In the spirit of the rugged individualist and the innovative origins of privateering,
privateers should, however, be required to enter sovereign territory by their own legal
and independent means, 162 with no unusual fast-tracking from the UNSC. Allowing
privateers to cross borders postcapture without presenting their actual commission as a
prerequisite to entry would open the system to abuse, as all manner of international
miscreants could claim to be acting under a letter of marque. 163 Upon capture of the
target, then, a privateer should inform its commissioning government of success (in
order to ensure safe passage) and the UNSC should permit privateers to cross
international borders and enter sovereign territory upon showing of a valid commission
and custody of the individual.'64
D. Regulatory Suggestions: Risks, Hazards, and Solutions
In developing a regulatory framework, Congress should ensure that the regulatory
body overseeing letters of marque adequately screens prospective privateers.
Legitimate applicants capable of meeting a threshold standard should include bounty
hunters and American defense contractors, as well as foreign or international groups
capable of demonstrating sufficient qualification and capability.
In times of piracy, a party of a neutral state was permitted to accept a commission
from a belligerent in the absence of a prohibitory treaty.' 65 This principle likely
precludes neutrals who are signatories to the Declaration of Paris from eligibility to
apply for American letters of marquee today. 66 One also cannot overlook the nature of
customary international law as international rules developed through general and
consistent state practices that are recognized as binding by states. Given the 150-year
prohibition on privateering, its ban surely qualifies as a norm of customary
international law, and its resurrection may consequently represent a violation of
customary international law.
To ensure that such potential holders of letters of marque adhere to international
legal standards, any proposed licensing system requires strict governance. While
privateers in earlier eras were highly autonomous, in light of the notorious Abu Ghraib
prison scandal, which saw allegations of prisoner abuse by American and coalition
160. See Supemor, supra note 41, at 235; see also Gall, supra note 132.
161. See Supernor, supra note 41, at 245.
162. See id. at 242.
163. See id.
164. See id. (arguing that a bounty hunter should be free to cross international borders if he
presents himself at the border with a valid indictment and with the indicted individual in
custody).
165. See HALL, supra note 9 at 599.
166. The Declaration of Paris abolished privateering, and signatory nations and their subjects
are bound to its tenets. No Middle Eastern countries are signatories, though many European
nations are. International Humanitarian Law-State Parties/Signatories, Declaration Respecting
Maritime Law, Paris, 16 April 1856, http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/WebSign?ReadForm&id
=105&ps=P (last visited Aug. 26, 2006).
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entities staffed by private enterprise, 167 the United States today would need to ensure
that privateers strictly comply with all regulatory requirements, and, in the case of a
violation of such requirements, endure punishment in full accordance with the law.
The regulatory body would also be wise to install precautions to ensure that
privateers did not wastefully focus on an improper or irrelevant target. Here, a "good
faith" standard may suffice. Reliance on a governmental compilation of sought
terrorists, such as the FBI's readily available wanted list168 would satisfy this standard.
It may also be prudent to establish a uniform remedy in the event of violation of the
rights of an innocent by a privateer. More so than in early privateering, the threat of a
civil action or criminal penalty may serve as an effective deterrent for such possible
abuses.
E. The Longshot: Domestic Constitutional Deadlock
As a closing note, there is a slight chance that, even in the narrow construction of
letters of marque presented here, constitutional deadlock could ensue. While this Note
envisions a system of letters of marque in line with recent practice-in which Congress
delegates war power to the President-Congress could enact letters of marque itself in
the face of presidential dissent. The Constitutional showdown would transpire upon a
presidential veto of letters of marque legislation. In order to reinstate letters of marque,
Congress would then have to override the President's veto. If Congress mustered the
necessary support, the President may then argue that such congressional action
interferes with the President's commander-in-chief power by exercising military power
in derogation of executive objectives. It is tempting to then refer this hypothetical
dispute to the courts and to analyze the possible outcomes. In the event of any letter-of-
marque litigation, the courts, however, would likely evade the issue by declaring it a
political question to be settled by the political branches. The end result, therefore, is
that the viability of privateering via letters of marque assumes presidential and
congressional agreement on the utility of a privateering revival.
CONCLUSION
The United States' War on Terror remains far from complete. While the military
has achieved many great successes, such as nearly eradicating the Taliban in
Afghanistan and dispatching various smaller terrorists and terrorist groups, it has thus
far failed in smaller operations, such as the apprehension of key terrorist leaders.
167. See Michaels, supra note 14, at 1033; Joel Brinkley, US. Civilian Working at Abu
Ghraib Disputes Army's Version of His Role in Abuses, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 2004, at A11;
Sewell Chan, US. Official: Abuse Allegations Are 'a Big Deal'; Charges Involving Army-Run
Prison in Iraq Seen as Setback for Military; Britain Launches Inquiry, WASH. POST, May 3,
2004, at Al 6; Seymour M. Hersh, Torture at Abu Ghraib, THE NEW YORKER, May 10, 2004, at
42.
168. Federal Bureau of Investigation Most Wanted Terrorists, http://www.fbi.gov/wanted/
terrorists/fugitives.htm (last visited Aug. 27, 2006). While the list currently displays only a
handful of wanted terrorists, it could easily be augmented. Furthermore, given global satellite
communications technology, the list would be easily accessible in many places a privateer
operated.
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Where overwhelming military might has failed, crack privateer outfits may succeed. In
order to harness America's greatest strength-private enterprise-the United States
should revive the aged but viable weapon of letters of marque and reprisal. Privateers
operating under letters of marque were invaluable in early conflicts with piracy-that
era's predominant mode of nonstate belligerency-and could exert an equally effective
impact on terrorism, the modem equivalent of nonstate belligerency. Small, privately-
funded teams of privateers would be most effective in human capture, asset seizure,
and communication disruption. Private enterprise is willing and able to engage in such
operations. The tools are available, as is the funding. Even so, privateers should not
operate entirely without regulation. Concordant with letters-of-marque legislation,
Congress should enact a regulatory system in order to maintain proper oversight. While
there are a number of potential obstacles to the resuscitation of letters of marque, they
are not incurable, and can in some cases be ameliorated through international
diplomacy, diligent regulation, and meticulous legislative drafting. Triumph over an
unorthodox foe demands examination of all possible weapons and deployment of every
viable tool in the American arsenal. This Note offers a starting point.
